A non-perpetual shirking model

Yu Fu Chen; Gylfi Zoega

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2015.06.021

A non-perpetual shirking model

Yu Fu Chen, Gylfi Zoega

Faculty of Economics

University of Iceland

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We provide a finite-horizon counterpart to the Shapiro and Stiglitz model of unemployment to show how workers' effort falls as they approach the end of an employment spell. The model provides a reason for wages rising more rapidly than productivity.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	98-101
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	134
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.06.021
Publication status	Published - 2015

Bibliographical note

Funding Information: Financial support from the Icelandic Centre for Research , grant 130551-053 and the University of Iceland Research Fund is gratefully acknowledged. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for comments. Publisher Copyright: © 2015 Elsevier B.V.

Other keywords

Finite horizons
Retirement
Shirking
Wages

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10.1016/j.econlet.2015.06.021

Cite this

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title = "A non-perpetual shirking model",

abstract = "We provide a finite-horizon counterpart to the Shapiro and Stiglitz model of unemployment to show how workers' effort falls as they approach the end of an employment spell. The model provides a reason for wages rising more rapidly than productivity.",

keywords = "Finite horizons, Retirement, Shirking, Wages",

author = "Chen, \{Yu Fu\} and Gylfi Zoega",

note = "Funding Information: Financial support from the Icelandic Centre for Research , grant 130551-053 and the University of Iceland Research Fund is gratefully acknowledged. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for comments. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2015 Elsevier B.V.",

year = "2015",

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2015.06.021",

language = "English",

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pages = "98--101",

journal = "Economics Letters",

issn = "0165-1765",

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AU - Chen, Yu Fu

AU - Zoega, Gylfi

N1 - Funding Information: Financial support from the Icelandic Centre for Research , grant 130551-053 and the University of Iceland Research Fund is gratefully acknowledged. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for comments. Publisher Copyright: © 2015 Elsevier B.V.

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Y1 - 2015

N2 - We provide a finite-horizon counterpart to the Shapiro and Stiglitz model of unemployment to show how workers' effort falls as they approach the end of an employment spell. The model provides a reason for wages rising more rapidly than productivity.

AB - We provide a finite-horizon counterpart to the Shapiro and Stiglitz model of unemployment to show how workers' effort falls as they approach the end of an employment spell. The model provides a reason for wages rising more rapidly than productivity.

KW - Finite horizons

KW - Retirement

KW - Shirking

KW - Wages

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84955442164

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.06.021

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.06.021

M3 - Article

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 134

SP - 98

EP - 101

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

ER -

A non-perpetual shirking model

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Other keywords

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