Experimental philosophy on time

James Norton

doi:10.1111/phc3.12779

Experimental philosophy on time

James Norton

School of Humanities

University of Iceland

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Appeals to the ‘common sense’, or ‘naïve’, or ‘folk’ concept of time, and the purported phenomenology as of time passing, play a substantial role in philosophical theorising about time. When making these appeals, philosophers have been content to draw upon their own assumptions about how non-philosophers think about time. This paper reviews a series of recent experiments bringing these assumptions into question. The results suggest that the way non-philosophers think about time is far less metaphysically demanding than philosophers have assumed.

Original language	English
Article number	e12779
Journal	Philosophy Compass
Volume	16
Issue number	11
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12779
Publication status	Published - Nov 2021

Bibliographical note

Funding Information: This paper benefited from insightful feedback from Sam Baron, Finnur Dells?n, Natalja Deng, Alison Fernandes, Andrew Latham, Emil M?nsson, Kristie Miller, John Norton, Bj?rn ?orsteinsson, Elmar Unnsteinsson, and an anonymous referee. Publisher Copyright: © 2021 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

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10.1111/phc3.12779

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title = "Experimental philosophy on time",

abstract = "Appeals to the {\textquoteleft}common sense{\textquoteright}, or {\textquoteleft}na{\"i}ve{\textquoteright}, or {\textquoteleft}folk{\textquoteright} concept of time, and the purported phenomenology as of time passing, play a substantial role in philosophical theorising about time. When making these appeals, philosophers have been content to draw upon their own assumptions about how non-philosophers think about time. This paper reviews a series of recent experiments bringing these assumptions into question. The results suggest that the way non-philosophers think about time is far less metaphysically demanding than philosophers have assumed.",

author = "James Norton",

note = "Funding Information: This paper benefited from insightful feedback from Sam Baron, Finnur Dells?n, Natalja Deng, Alison Fernandes, Andrew Latham, Emil M?nsson, Kristie Miller, John Norton, Bj?rn ?orsteinsson, Elmar Unnsteinsson, and an anonymous referee. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021 John Wiley \& Sons Ltd.",

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N2 - Appeals to the ‘common sense’, or ‘naïve’, or ‘folk’ concept of time, and the purported phenomenology as of time passing, play a substantial role in philosophical theorising about time. When making these appeals, philosophers have been content to draw upon their own assumptions about how non-philosophers think about time. This paper reviews a series of recent experiments bringing these assumptions into question. The results suggest that the way non-philosophers think about time is far less metaphysically demanding than philosophers have assumed.

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Experimental philosophy on time

Abstract

Bibliographical note

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