From Evil, Useless Pity to Active Empathy or generositas: Empathetic Emotions in Spinoza’s Ethics

This chapter analyses Spinoza’s account of empathetic emotions, focusing on their role in his ethical theory. It shows that the psychological mechanism producing empathy, which Spinoza calls ‘the imitation of the affects’, is based on associations of ideas—particularly on ideas of agents’ own emotional states and those of others. Spinoza’s account differs from the traditional views that underline complex judgements as necessary components of empathetic reactions and anticipates the Humean account of sympathy. Spinoza’s rejection of the central empathetic emotions, such as pity and compassion, has led some authors to accuse him of indifference towards others’ suffering. This chapter argues instead that Spinoza rejects these empathetic emotions owing to their status as passions while defending a rational empathic concern called nobility. Nobility involves caring for the well-being of others but without the sad passions necessarily linked to pity and compassion and plays an important role in securing a virtuous motivation.