Resource Rent and its Distribution in Iceland’s Fisheries

Sveinn Agnarsson; Stefán Bjarni Gunnlaugsson; Hörður Sævaldsson; Daði Már Kristófersson

doi:10.1086/708507

Resource Rent and its Distribution in Iceland’s Fisheries

University of Iceland, University of Akureyri

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This article provides an estimate of resource rent creation and its distribution in Icelandic fisheries, which have been administered by an individual transferable quota (ITQ) management system for almost three decades. This study examined the period from 1997 to 2017. Little rent was produced in the first years; however, since 2008, rent has been significant, averaging 380 million USD per year, which is around 17% of the export value of the fishing industry. Approximately 20% of the rent went to the public due to a special fishing fee and through corporate taxes. The remainder was evenly split between those who originally acquired their fishing rights by grandfathering but have cashed in their windfall gains and traded their quotas, hereinafter referred to as quota sellers, and the companies working in the fishing industry, each receiving around 40% of the rent.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	113-135
Number of pages	23
Journal	Marine Resource Economics
Volume	35
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1086/708507
Publication status	Published - 1 Apr 2020

Bibliographical note

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 1 No Poverty
SDG 2 Zero Hunger
SDG 3 Good Health and Well-being
SDG 4 Quality Education
SDG 5 Gender Equality
SDG 6 Clean Water and Sanitation
SDG 7 Affordable and Clean Energy
SDG 8 Decent Work and Economic Growth
SDG 9 Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure
SDG 10 Reduced Inequalities
SDG 11 Sustainable Cities and Communities
SDG 12 Responsible Consumption and Production
SDG 13 Climate Action
SDG 14 Life Below Water
SDG 15 Life on Land
SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions
SDG 17 Partnerships for the Goals

Other keywords

Fishing fee
ITQ
Icelandic fisheries
Rent distribution
Rent taxation
Resource rent
Transitional gains trap

Access to Document

10.1086/708507

Cite this

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title = "Resource Rent and its Distribution in Iceland{\textquoteright}s Fisheries",

abstract = "This article provides an estimate of resource rent creation and its distribution in Icelandic fisheries, which have been administered by an individual transferable quota (ITQ) management system for almost three decades. This study examined the period from 1997 to 2017. Little rent was produced in the first years; however, since 2008, rent has been significant, averaging 380 million USD per year, which is around 17\% of the export value of the fishing industry. Approximately 20\% of the rent went to the public due to a special fishing fee and through corporate taxes. The remainder was evenly split between those who originally acquired their fishing rights by grandfathering but have cashed in their windfall gains and traded their quotas, hereinafter referred to as quota sellers, and the companies working in the fishing industry, each receiving around 40\% of the rent.",

keywords = "Fishing fee, ITQ, Icelandic fisheries, Rent distribution, Rent taxation, Resource rent, Transitional gains trap",

author = "Sveinn Agnarsson and Gunnlaugsson, \{Stef{\'a}n Bjarni\} and H{\"o}r{\dh}ur S{\ae}valdsson and Krist{\'o}fersson, \{Da{\dh}i M{\'a}r\}",

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doi = "10.1086/708507",

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journal = "Marine Resource Economics",

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TY - JOUR

T1 - Resource Rent and its Distribution in Iceland’s Fisheries

AU - Agnarsson, Sveinn

AU - Gunnlaugsson, Stefán Bjarni

AU - Sævaldsson, Hörður

AU - Kristófersson, Daði Már

PY - 2020/4/1

Y1 - 2020/4/1

N2 - This article provides an estimate of resource rent creation and its distribution in Icelandic fisheries, which have been administered by an individual transferable quota (ITQ) management system for almost three decades. This study examined the period from 1997 to 2017. Little rent was produced in the first years; however, since 2008, rent has been significant, averaging 380 million USD per year, which is around 17% of the export value of the fishing industry. Approximately 20% of the rent went to the public due to a special fishing fee and through corporate taxes. The remainder was evenly split between those who originally acquired their fishing rights by grandfathering but have cashed in their windfall gains and traded their quotas, hereinafter referred to as quota sellers, and the companies working in the fishing industry, each receiving around 40% of the rent.

AB - This article provides an estimate of resource rent creation and its distribution in Icelandic fisheries, which have been administered by an individual transferable quota (ITQ) management system for almost three decades. This study examined the period from 1997 to 2017. Little rent was produced in the first years; however, since 2008, rent has been significant, averaging 380 million USD per year, which is around 17% of the export value of the fishing industry. Approximately 20% of the rent went to the public due to a special fishing fee and through corporate taxes. The remainder was evenly split between those who originally acquired their fishing rights by grandfathering but have cashed in their windfall gains and traded their quotas, hereinafter referred to as quota sellers, and the companies working in the fishing industry, each receiving around 40% of the rent.

KW - Fishing fee

KW - ITQ

KW - Icelandic fisheries

KW - Rent distribution

KW - Rent taxation

KW - Resource rent

KW - Transitional gains trap

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85084432347

U2 - 10.1086/708507

DO - 10.1086/708507

M3 - Article

SN - 0738-1360

VL - 35

SP - 113

EP - 135

JO - Marine Resource Economics

JF - Marine Resource Economics

IS - 2

ER -

Resource Rent and its Distribution in Iceland’s Fisheries

Abstract

Bibliographical note

UN SDGs

Other keywords

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