TY - JOUR
T1 - Thinking about Progress
T2 - From Science to Philosophy
AU - Dellsén, Finnur
AU - Lawler, Insa
AU - Norton, James
N1 - Funding Information: For insightful and constructive comments on earlier drafts of this paper, we're grateful to Sam Baron, Victor Magnússon, Kristie Miller, John Norton, Robert Smithson, and two anonymous referees for this journal. The research for this paper was funded by the Icelandic Centre for Research (grant number: 195617-051). Funding Information: For insightful and constructive comments on earlier drafts of this paper, we're grateful to Sam Baron, Victor Magnússon, Kristie Miller, John Norton, Robert Smithson, and two anonymous referees for this journal. The research for this paper was funded by the Icelandic Centre for Research (grant number: 195617‐051). Publisher Copyright: © 2021 The Authors. Noûs published by Wiley Periodicals LLC.
PY - 2022/12
Y1 - 2022/12
N2 - Is there progress in philosophy? If so, how much? Philosophers have recently argued for a wide range of answers to these questions, from the view that there is no progress whatsoever to the view that philosophy has provided answers to all the big philosophical questions. However, these views are difficult to compare and evaluate, because they rest on very different assumptions about the conditions under which philosophy would make progress. This paper looks to the comparatively mature debate about scientific progress for inspiration on how to formulate four distinct accounts of philosophical progress, in terms of truthlikeness, problem-solving, knowledge, and understanding. Equally importantly, the paper outlines a common framework for how to understand and evaluate these accounts. We distill a series of lessons from this exercise, to help pave the way for a more fruitful discussion about philosophical progress in the future.
AB - Is there progress in philosophy? If so, how much? Philosophers have recently argued for a wide range of answers to these questions, from the view that there is no progress whatsoever to the view that philosophy has provided answers to all the big philosophical questions. However, these views are difficult to compare and evaluate, because they rest on very different assumptions about the conditions under which philosophy would make progress. This paper looks to the comparatively mature debate about scientific progress for inspiration on how to formulate four distinct accounts of philosophical progress, in terms of truthlikeness, problem-solving, knowledge, and understanding. Equally importantly, the paper outlines a common framework for how to understand and evaluate these accounts. We distill a series of lessons from this exercise, to help pave the way for a more fruitful discussion about philosophical progress in the future.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85143247940
U2 - 10.1111/nous.12383
DO - 10.1111/nous.12383
M3 - Article
SN - 0029-4624
VL - 56
SP - 814
EP - 840
JO - Nous
JF - Nous
IS - 4
ER -